How the money was hidden in Switzerland - 3
Press investigation news.

Sagyndyk MENDYBAEV, Nikolai FOMIN, Victor SHELGUNOV

In 1993, in his address to the parliament President Nazarbaev voiced a risky thesis: the initial capital cannot be made in white mittens. He clearly had in mind Europe (piratical Britain), and the United States (bootleggers’ millions of today’s respectable families). We were left with no choice but to assume that our young and newly independent Kazakhstan will be plunged into the epoch of Francis Drake or Al Capone thanks to the President's efforts.

The third stage of Kazakh “capital building” abroad started in 1998. The year turned to be a landmark for Nazarbaev himself. Financial thunderstorms reigned in the Republic. Gold and hard currency reserve melted, macroeconomic indices went down, and, what is most important, the President got a significantly informed opponent – former Premier Kazhegeldin.

Kazhegeldin has never been Nazarbaev’s agent. Many secrets of the Almaty court remained closed for him. The President was very careful to provide that “his people”, namely Abishev, Abykaev, Giffen, Utemuratov, Luchansky, Balgimbaev, could not come establish close and informal relations with the Prime Minister. President’s allies was not disposed towards the “Semipalatinsk upstart”. While the first trade houses were being opened abroad and the Republic’s steersmen started to enjoy their “dolce vita” abroad, Kazhegeldin was engaged in coal business in provinces. Such psychological distance, and hardly concealed disdain cost some Nazarbaev’s friends very dear. Being a businessman and economist, Kazhegeldin was smart to use the bureaucratic intrigues and do much harm to Giffen, Abishev, and Balgimabaev. He acted in a sophisticated style of the East, avoiding head-on attacks, using other persons. Nazarbaev’s allies were quick to realize that the "Father" is about to bring up a potential leader who would surpass his Father and benefactor.

The ambitions of President’s allies were true just in one respect: premiers come and leave while Presidents (especially the First President) are almost eternal. According to the Constitution, Premier’s term in office depended solely on Nazarbaev. If Kazhegeldin had been helpless, he would have hardly worked till the end of 1996. However he took care to make his resignation extremely undesirable for the President from the political point of view. There were at least four reasons for this.

Firstly, Kazhegeldin launched his own image campaign in the media. He used any chance to emphasize his role in the improvement of the economic situation, cited by heart hundreds of figures, presented complex schemes and looked like a Kazakh Samuelson, especially in comparison with economically not advanced President. A rare case for the CIS countries: the Premier who was responsible for the extremely painful reforms of 1997 had the rating that could have been compared to that of the President.

Secondly, even under the circumstances of Nazarbaev’s absolute personnel power, Kazhegeldin was able to hammer together his own team, and several Kazakh businessmen joined it. It was impossible to destroy the team by the efforts of secret services or the President’s will. Nazarbaev made it in another way: he fired Kazhegeldin and took young ambitious businessmen to HIS bosom, appointed them on responsible positions in government thus discouraging them from supporting in any way the Premier who had fell out of grace. However the maneuver was rather time-consuming.

Thirdly, Kazhegeldin took responsibility for solving a number of strategic problems. He emphasized that he got conceptual independent keys for forming stock market, attracting foreign investors, portfolio investments, pension reforms, banking stabilization. It seemed that saying goodbye to Kazhegeldin would result in weakening Kazakhstan’s attractiveness for the West as it would be hard to find such professional and popular Premier. In autumn 1997, these expectations came true. The West showed its discontent with the Premier’s groundless resignation and Nazarbaev actually turned to be unable to find satisfactory replacement among loyal persons. However that was the price for minimizing political risks: it was impossible for Nazarbaev and his entourage to employ Kazhegeldin – in a couple of years the President was likely to make up his mind with the Premier’s role as a political successor.

And, fourthly and finally, Kazhegeldin knew too much. Not everything, indeed (otherwise they had to organize a car accident instead of firing him), but much. Later it turned out that Kazhegeldin had secret contacts in Kazakhstani secret services and copied many official, service, and confidential documents, as well as operating memos and telegrams. However even in the most crucial moments of their opposition ex-Premier hesitated to make public confidential information on Nazarbaev and his financial stories. Actually he threatened to do it, or alluded to it. For a stranger, it looked as if two swore secret holders played their quiet game. Kazhegeldin was making Nazarbaev to rebate and Nazarbaev with his energy that deserved better areas of application was “shooting” ex-Premier’s supporters and initiating more and more criminal cases against him.

The open letter Akezhan Kazhegeldin addressed to Yuri Khitrin, the RK Prosecutor General, contains several valuable references to foreign assets of the Nazarbaevs. The letter was written shortly after the unexpected arrest of the ex-premier in Russia requested by Kazak side. They tried to take Kazhegeldin to Astana to “solve his problem” in some comfortable cell of President’s palace, however such plans failed. The danger was too real, and Kazhegeldin preferred to unveil some information which threatened with further disclosures in the case Kazakhstani secret services would continue to persecute him abroad. Below are some excerpt from his letter:

“Villas, castles, and land believed to be mine belong to other persons, or companies. The only thing that unites all the real estate in question is that they are linked to Eurasia Travel Company that is closely connected with President Nazarbaev. The Company’s offices as well as that of other companies that own these property have got the same address. The chiefs of both companies are identical. Eurasia Travel Company (and those who run it) serves and pays for the President’s and his family stay at the most expensive resorts of the world.

If interrelation between Eurasia Travel executives and Kazakhstani government - Eurasiagate – is not a corruption, if it is not a misconduct of a state official, Mr. Prosecutor General, you have to give your appropriate explanation.

I have got copies of documents related to state property privatization, obtained and granted credits and privileges, transfers of money received for privatized property inside and outside the country, etc. That’s why I look forward to the next wave of your appeals related to “corruption” and “malversation” rather calmly.

Naturally, being the Prime Minister of independent Kazakhstan, I opened accounts in several western banks on behalf of the state. They were opened to accumulate part of the assets obtained as a result of state property privatization and exploitation of mineral resources. I would never use these assets on other needs but the needs of the state, approved and ordered by President Nazarbaev.

It was with the sanction and the privity of President, that a number of transactions was made. As a result dozens of millions of dollars were accumulated on the accounts of a non-budget Foundation of Kazakhstan Development, and President Nazarbaev personally controls them. It is the Foundation account to which 2.5 mln you are looking for were deposited in checks. President Nazarbaev and Nurtan Abykaev can confirm this. And even if they do not, I possess bank statements to prove I am telling the truth.

The Prosecutor General of Kazakhstan can and must check the sheets of this Foundation as well other foundations. Unfortunately, you are unlikely to be allowed to report who and how spent dozens and hundreds of dollars from other accounts controlled by the President and his people. Weren't it spent on palaces and villas bought for Kazakh "noblemen" in the bright wide world?

And again I ask you where are those two billion dollars – the credits guaranteed by the state and obtained from the US Eximbank and other organizations and then embezzled with the consent and the privity of the country's higher officials long before my appointment. The defalcators are well known, they are not only imprisoned but take an active part in the political and state life on the side of the President. The task of Prosecutor General is to exert every effort to return at least part of stolen money and thus to relieve Kazakhstan budget of the burden of debts, isn’t it?

And what has happened to more than billion dollars in cash that my Government left on the Treasury accounts before its resignation? Half of this money had to be paid to veteran pensioners, as wages to public officers, and used to renovate schools and hospitals. Mr. Prosecutor General, you and other top officials of the country are responsible for the fact that the mystery of this money has remained unraveled.

I am ready make public all the Kazakh Treasury accounts in foreign banks that were opened during my time in office. However before I do so I would like to get a document saying that I would not held responsible for disclosing state secrets as, according to your recently passed law, our citizens have no right to know how the assets of the country are spent."

How the money was hidden in Switzerland- 1

https://neweurasia.info/archive/2000/analyse_en/07_05_stole1_eng.htm

How the money was hidden in Switzerland - 2

https://neweurasia.info/archive/2000/analyse_en/07_07_Stole2_eng.htm